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New York v. Belton: The Scope of Warrantless
Searches Extended
The United States Supreme Court, in New York v. Belton, expanded the
area in which a policeman may search after he has made a lawful custo-
dial arrest. In so ruling, the Supreme Court dramatically departed from
its previous holding in Chimel v. California. While Chimel limited the
area of the search to the area "within the immediate control of the arres-
tee," Belton allowed a search outside of that established boundary, as the
Supreme Court allowed the search to include the passenger compartment
of an automobile which the arrestee had not occupied.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, in New York v. Belton,' was
called upon once again to determine the permissible scope of a
warrantless search. 2 In a dramatic departure from its previous
decisions, the Court held that "when a policeman has made a law-
ful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile."'3 This is so despite the fact that
1. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), reh. denied, 102 S. Ct. 26 (1981).
2. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (a warrantless search of the
defendant's entire house was held unreasonable as extending beyond the area
from which the defendant might have obtained a weapon or destroyed evidence);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (a warrantless search of the de-
fendant's one-room office pursuant to a valid arrest was held not unreasonable,
notwithstanding the officers having had time to obtain a search warrant prior to
the arrest and search); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (where there
was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant before searching the premises, a
search and seizure without a warrant was unreasonable even though a custodial
arrest occurred); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (a warrantless
search and seizure of account books and papers as an incident to an arrest was
valid where the items seized were in the immediate possession and control of the
person arrested); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (a warrantless
search of an automobile for contraband liquor was upheld where officers had prob-
able cause for suspecting its presence). There are many categories of warrantless
searches; e.g., consent searches, searches pursuant to a custodial arrest, a stop and
frisk, auto searches (of an impounded vehicle and pursuant to an arrest), and
searches conducted incident to an arrest involving hot pursuit. There will be a de-
tailed discussion of warrantless searches in the historical background section of
this note. See notes 25-31 and accompanying text infra.
3. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. The Court stated that it was applying the principles of
Chimel to Belton. See note 50 infra. The Court emphasized that Chimel's princi-
ples were not being altered in any way. Despite Justice Stewart's assertion that
Belton "in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel
the arrestee is no longer an occupant of the automobile nor able
to gain access to that interior.
Chimel v. California,4 decided by the Court in 1969, established
that an officer may conduct a warrantless search of the area
"within the immediate control" of the arrestee.5 The underlying
rationale of this ruling was that any area within the arrestee's
"immediate control" was well within the arrestee's reach and that
the arrestee could therefore extend into that area to destroy evi-
dence or obtain a weapon. Justice Stewart, writing for the major-
ity in New York v. Belton,6 claimed to have relied upon Chimel.
As will be discussed herein, Justice Stewart's reliance was mis-
placed as Chimel set "temporal and spatial" limitations 7 on
searches incident to an arrest. This point was emphasized by Jus-
tice Brennan in his dissent,8 who noted that the arrestee in New
York v. Belton was standing outside the vehicle while the search
was conducted and had no access to the automobile interior.
Brennan argued that not only was Justice Stewart's reliance on
Chimel misplaced, but also that the search inside the car was not
within the limits of Chimel.
The Court's decision in New York v. Belton is significant in that
it allowed the warrantless search of an area in total abrogation of
the principles established in Chimel.9 Such a radical departure
from Chimel's principles makes it doubtful that Chimel will con-
tinue to be viable in the law of warrantless searches. Further-
more, the clarity Chimel propagated in this area of criminal
procedure law has now been muddied by the decision in New
York v. Belton.
This casenote will present the facts of Belton and trace the de-
velopment of warrantless searches. The author will analyze the
basis of the Supreme Court's decision, indicating the extent to
which the decision departs from previous holdings. In addition,
this paper will examine the significance of the Belton decision as
it relates to cases which will be decided in the future.
case" 1Oi S. Ct. at 2864, n.3, the author will show in this casenote that the opposite
is true. Chimel's principles will be discussed in the historical background section
of this note. See notes 46-52 and accompanying text infra.
4. ,395 U.S. 752 (1969).
5. Id. at 763. The Court pointed out that the area within an arrestee's "imme-
diate control" meant the area from which the arrestee "might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence." Id.
6. Justice Stewart was joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Powell. Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens wrote separate concurring
opinions.
7. 101 S. Ct. at 2867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. Id. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in the dissent. Justice White,
wrote a separate dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall.
9. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF NEW YORK V. BELTON
On April 9, 1978, the defendant and three companions were trav-
eling on the New York State Thruway when their car was stopped
by a state trooper for speeding. As the officer scrutinized the ve-
hicle and its occupants, he smelled the odor of marijuana. Glanc-
ing inside the vehicle, the officer observed an envelope marked
"Supergold" on the floor of the vehicle which he recognized to be
the type commonly used to hold marijuana.' 0
The occupants were told to get out of the vehicle and placed
under arrest. After giving the occupants a Miranda warning,"
the officer searched each of them. The officer then proceeded to
search the passenger compartment of the car. Finding a black
leather jacket on the back seat, he opened a zippered pocket and
discovered a small amount of cocaine. 12
Following a denial of a motion to suppress the cocaine as ille-
gally seized evidence, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted
possession of a criminal substance in the sixth degree.' 3 A unani-
mous Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court's holding that the warrantless search of the
jacket was lawful as incident to the defendant's arrest for posses-
sion of marijuana.' 4
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where
there is no danger of destruction of the evidence, a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest cannot be upheld.15
10. 101 S. Ct. at 2861-62.
11. When an individual is taken into custody, a Miranda warning informs the
individual that prior to any questioning:
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
12. 101 S. Ct. at 2862.
13. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 199 (N.Y. 1979). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.05
(McKinney 1980) states that "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a con-
trolled substance in the sixth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses
one hundred or more but less than five hundred milligrams of undiluted
phencyclidine."
14. 68 A.D.2d at 201. The court stated that "[Ojnce [the] defendant was val-
idly arrested for possession of marihuana, the officer was justified in searching the
immediate area for other contraband." Id. The court pointed out that an officer
could search the personal effects of the arrestee that are "ready to hand." In light
of this, the court held that the search of the defendant's jacket was reasonable in
"scope, intensity and duration." Id.
15. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 407 N.E.2d 420 (1980). The
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SEARCHES
A search has been defined as:
some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for
or seeking out. The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by
force, and it has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either
actual or constructive, much or little. A search implies a prying into hid-
den places for that which is concealed and that the object searched for has
been hidden or intentionally put out of the way .... 16
That a search has been interpreted broadly is evidenced by the
Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States.17 In Katz, the
Court found that the government's activities in wiretapping a
public telephone booth and listening to and recording the defend-
ant's words spoken into a telephone receiver constituted a
"search."18 In Belton, the officer's examination of the interior of
the automobile and search through the pockets of the defendant's
jacket constituted a classic example of a "search."' 9
A. A Search Warrant and the Purpose Served by its Issuance
Generally, no search can be conducted without a warrant.20 "A
search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the state,
signed by a magistrate and directed to a peace officer, command-
ing him to search for personal property and bring it before the
magistrate .... "21
An important purpose served by requiring a search warrant is
that it "'interposes an orderly procedure' involving 'judicial im-
partiality' whereby a 'neutral and detached magistrate' can make
'informed and deliberate determinations' on the issue of probable
court emphasized that the defendant was under arrest and outside of the automo-
bile. The automobile "was in a secure place where it could have been easily
guarded" while a search warrant was obtained. Id. at 452.
16. 1 W. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE; 222 (1978) (quoting C.J.S., Searches and
Seizures § 1 (1952)).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court emphasized that "[w]herever a man may
be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id. at 359.
18. Id. at 353. In holding that the government's activities constituted a search,
the Court specifically overruled the "trespass" doctrine which was established in
Olmstead v.,United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
19. This is so because the officer was involved in an exploratory investigation.
The officer smelled the odor of marijuana and saw the envelope marked
"Supergold." He was thus prying into hidden places where marijuana might be
concealed. This is the essence of a search. See note 16 supra and accompanying
text.
20. In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), the Court stressed the im-
portance of obtaining a search warrant by saying, "[ilt is a cardinal rule that, in
seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search
warrants wherever reasonably practicable." Id. at 705.
21. Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 331, 135 P.2d 242, 247-48 (1943).
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cause."22 If a peace officer was himself allowed to determine
whether probable cause to search existed, there would inevitably
be many abuses. An officer might abuse such discretion in
searching because of bias or prejudice directed toward the victim
of the search. 23 The officer might also be caught up in the heat of
the action and be forced to make hurried and unjustified deci-
sions. Under these conditions, the mandates of the fourth amend-
ment are not likely to be followed.24
B. Warrantless Searches
One exception to the warrant requirement is a search con-
ducted pursuant to voluntary consent.25 The rationale for al-
lowing a warrantless search when consent is voluntarily given is
that an individual can willingly waive his right of requiring a war-
rant.26 Another exception to the warrant requirement was estab-
22. 2 W. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 29 (1978) (quoting United States v. Jef-
fers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)). Justice Clark, in Jeffers, stated that interposing a de-
tached and neutral magistrate to determine whether probable cause to search
exists is necessary to attain the "beneficient purposes intended" by the fourth
amendment. Id. at 51.
In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), police officers conducted a war-
rantless search of a room from which emanated the odor of opium. In holding the
search invalid, the Court stated that "[w] hen the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or Government enforcement agent." Id. at 14.
The preference for search warrants when conducting searches was emphasized
by the Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) where it stated that "'the in-
formed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants
... are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers ... who may happen to
make arrests.'" Id. at 110-11 (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464
(1932)).
23. The fourth amendment was designed to protect against the abuses of gen-
eral warrants and searches that had alienated the colonists of early America.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 761. The general warrant empowered the officer to
search at his will wherever he expected smuggled goods to be, and to break open
any container and package that he suspected contained smuggled goods. N. Las-
son, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, 53-54 (1937). Similar abuses would no doubt occur'if an of-
ficer was allowed to determine for himself whether probable cause to search
existed.
24. See note 22 supra and accompanying text..
25. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The consent to search can-
not be obtained by any means of fraud or similar conduct. In Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court held that obtaining consent to search by a
claim of authority is no consent at all. A police officer conducting the search as-
serted that he possessed a search warrant and based on this information the
homeowner consented to a search.
26. The consent must be voluntary. Voluntariness is a question of fact which
lished in Terry v. Ohio,27 where the Court stated that a police
officer may conduct "a reasonable search for weapons for the pro-
tection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he
is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime."28 Likewise, search warrants are not required when 1) po-
lice are in hot pursuit of an offender;2 9 2) when police search an
automobile suspected of carrying illegal material while the vehi-
cle is stopped on the highway and the driver or occupants have
not yet been placed under arrest;30 and 3) when police search an
individual who has been lawfully arrested.3 1
must be determined from the totality of the surrounding circumstances.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227. Knowledge of the right to refuse con-
sent is a factor to be considered in the determination of voluntariness; but it is
not, standing alone, conclusive to the determination. Id.
27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). An officer observed three men who appeared to be "cas-
ing" a store for a robbery, and approached them for questioning. The officer then
frisked them, finding weapons on two of the men. The officer testified that he only
patted the men down and did not put his hands under any outer clothing until he
felt their guns.
28. Id. at 27.
29. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In Warden, police were informed
that an armed robbery had taken place and that the suspect had entered a certain
house five minutes before they reached it. The Court upheld the warrantless
search of the house because delay would endanger the lives of police and others.
Speed was "essential" to insure that police had control of all weapons which could
be used against them. Id. at 299.
30. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the United States Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility into evidence of contraband liquor seized in a war-
rantless search of a car on the highway. The Court determined that since a vehi-
cle can be quickly moved out of a jurisdiction, it may be searched without a
warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe it contains contraband. Id. at
153. The question remaining after the Carroll decision was whether Carroll could
be relied upon to justify a warrantless search of the car after the arrest of the
driver. One court answered in the negative, stating that "[eIxigencies do not exist
when the vehicle and the suspect are both in police custody." Ramon v. Cupp, 423
F.2d 248, 249 (9th Cir. 1970).
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the United States Supreme Court
came to a contrary conclusion. In Chambers, police stopped a car that fit the
description of one that was used in the robbery of a service station. The occu-
pants were arrested and the car was driven to a police station. The police con-
ducted a warrantless search of the car at the station and found incriminating
evidence. While upholding the validity of the search, Justice White, speaking for
the majority, stated: "For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between
on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause
issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search
without a warrant." Id. at 52. Justice White believed that if probable cause to
search existed, then either course would be reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. Id.
31. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court stated that the
right to search a person who is legally arrested in order to uncover evidence of a
crime has been uniformly maintained in many cases. Id.
The statement by the Court in Weeks only dealt with a warrantless search of a
"person;" it made no mention of a warrantless search of the "place" where an ar-
rest occurs. Id.
[Vol. 9: 919, 19821 Warrantless Searches Extended
PEPPERDINE LAW IIEVIEW
C. Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest: Areas Within the
Control of the Arrestee
In Carroll v. United States,32 decided in 1925, the Supreme
Court stated that "[w] hen a man is legally arrested for an offense,
whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is un-
lawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the of-
fense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution."33
In just over seven months after the Carroll decision, the Supreme
Court in Agnello v. United States,34 in dictum, stated that an of-
ficer could conduct a warrantless search of the "place" where the
arrest is made.35
. In Harris v. United States,36 officers obtained a warrant for Har-
ris' arrest. After arresting Harris at his apartment, the officers,
who did not have a search warrant, conducted an extensive
search of the apartment and found incriminating evidence. The
Court upheld the search, stating that "[s] earch and seizure inci-
dent to a lawful arrest is a practice of ancient origin .... -37
32. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See supra note 30. The defendants were arrested by
government agents for transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile in viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Act. The automobile was searched without a war-
rant. The conviction of the defendants was affirmed. Id. at 134-36.
33. Id. at 158. Section 26 of the National Prohibition Law provided that when
an officer discovered a person transporting liquor, the officer could seize the liquor
and arrest the person in charge. Id. at 139.
34. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Government agents arrested the defendants at one
Alba's house and seized cocaine they discovered on the premises. The agents
then went to Agnello's home which was several blocks away and conducted a
search without a Warrant and again discovered cocaine. The Court held that the
search of Agnello's house and subsequent seizure of cocaine violated the fourth
amendment. Id. at 33. The search of Agnello's house was not a search incident to
an arrest. Id. at 31.
35. The Court said that "[t]he right without a search warrant . . . to search
the place where an arrest is made ... is not to be doubted." Id. at 30. In Agnello,
"place" meant the immediate area where the defendants were arrested. Id. at 29.
36. 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The warrant for Harris' arrest was based on an alleged
violation of the Mail Fraud Statute. A second warrant charged Harris with intent
to defraud banks. Five agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation went, to Har-
ris' apartment and arrested him, seeking two cancelled checks. Inside -a 'desk
drawer, one agent found a sealed envelope marked "George Harris, personal pa-
pers." These were used to secure Harris' conviction for violating the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940. Id.
37. Id. at 150. The Harris decision expanded the scope of a warrantless search
as enunciated in Agnello. Agnello held that officers could search the "Place"
where an arrest occurs, that meaning the immediate area of the arrest. See note
35 supra. In Harris, the Court upheld the search of a four-room apartment pursu-
ant to an arrest. This was a definite expansion of the scope of a warrantless
search.
One year after the Harris decision, the Supreme Court took a
stricter approach to warrantless searches incident to arrest. In
Trupiano v. United States,38 government agents conducted a raid
on an illegal distillery which had been Under surveillance for
some time. The Trupiano decision upheld the warrantless arrest
of one of the defendants operating the still, based on the theory
that the defendant was committing a felony in the presence of a
government agent.39 The seizure of the illicit distillery, however,
was invalidated because the Court believed that law enforcement
agents must secure and use search warrants whenever reason-
ably practicable. 40 The Court went. on to state that in order to
search without a warrant, "there must be something more in the
way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest."4 1 To conduct a
warrantless search pursuant to a lawful arrest, there must be a
factor which "would make it unreasonable or impracticable to re-
quire the arresting officer to equip himself with a search
warrant."
42
In United States v. Rabinowitz, a case which overruled Trupi-
ano to the extent that it mandated other warrantless search crite-
ria besides "reasonableness" pursuant to a lawful arrest,43 federal
authorities had been informed that the defendant was dealing in
stamps bearing forged overprints. Armed with an arrest warrant,
government authorities went to the defendant's place of business,
a one-room office open to the public. After arresting the defend-
ant, the officers extensively searched the desk, safe, and file cabi-
nets in the office. The agents found and seized 573 stamps with
forged overprints. The Court held that the warrantless search of
38. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
39. Id. at 705. The government agents went upon the property where the still
was located with the consent of the owner. One of the agents saw a defendant
through an open doorway operating the still. Id. at 704.
40. Id. In Trupiano, it would have been reasonably practicable to obtain a
search warrant. For almost a month preceding the raid, a government agent
worked as a "mash man" for the defendants. It was possible for the agent to sup-
ply the information necessary to obtain an effective search warrant. Id. at 706.
41. Id. at 708. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), where
the Court reversed a conviction of racketeering. The Court ruled that the evidence
obtained without a search warrant should have been suppressed. Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, stated that "[w] here, as here, officers are not responding
to an emergency, there must be compelling reasons to justify the absence of a
search warrant." Id. at 454.
42. 334 U.S. at 708. Trupiano had the effect of severely limiting the scope of
warrantless searches established by the Harris decision. Under Trupiano, the
search in Harris would not have been permissible since it would have been practi-
cable for the government agents to obtain a search warrant.
43. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). "To the extent that Trupiano v. United States . . .re-
quires a search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it
rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case
is overruled." Id. at 66.
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the premises under the control of the person arrested, where the
crime was being committed, was not "unreasonable."44 The Court
went on to state that the validity of a warrantless search depends
upon "the reasonableness under all the circumstances and not
upon the practicability of procuring a search warrant. .... ,,45
The next significant decision regarding warrantless searches
was Chimel v. California,4 6 on which the majority in Belton
strongly relied. When three police officers arrived at the home of
Ted Chimel with an arrest warrant, they were ushered inside by
Chimel's wife. There they waited for Chimel to arrive. When
Chimel entered the house, he was arrested by the officers. Over
Chimel's objections, the officers conducted an extensive search of
the house.47 The officers found numerous items which were taken
and admitted into evidence; Chimel was subsequently convicted
for the burglary of a local coin shop. The search was upheld by
the California Supreme Court as incident to a lawful arrest.4 8
That decision was basically an application of the "reasonable-
ness" test established in Rabinowitz.49
The United States Supreme Court reversed Chimel's convic-
tion, and stated that "[t]here [was] ample justification . . .for a
search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control,' "50 but no justification existed for searching a room
44. Id. at 61. The warrantless search of Rabinowitz's one-room office was held
to be reasonable because the search and seizure were incident to a lawful arrest;
the room was small and under Rabinowitz's complete control; the search was lim-
ited to the one room where the forged stamps were found; and possession of the
forged stamps was a crime. Id. at 64.
45. Id. at 65-66. See note 43 supra. The Court stated that "[t]he relevant test
is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable." Id. at 66.
46. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
47. The officers, accompanied by Chimel's wife, searched the entire three-bed-
room house. "In the master bedroom and sewing room,. . . the officers directed
the petitioner's wife to open drawers and 'to physically move contents of the draw-
ers from side to side so that [the officers] might view any [fruits of the] bur-
glary.'" Id. at 754.
48. People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr 421 (1968). The
court stated that the search was "reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 442.
49. The Court, in Rabinowitz, established that the relevant test was whether
the search was "reasonable." See note 45 supra. The Court, in People v. Chimel,
held that the search of Chimel's house was "reasonable" because the search was
pursuant to a lawful arrest and "only items which reasonably appeared to be con-
nected with the ... burglary were seized." Id. at 442-43.
50. 395 U.S. at 763. The Court justified this by stating that such a search was
where an arrest did not occur.5 1 The Court interpreted the area
"within his immediate control" to mean the area from which the
arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or possession of evi-
dence which he could then destroy.5 2
D. Conflicting Decisions Interpreting the Proper Scope
of a Search
Federal courts have not been in agreement regarding the scope
of a search of the interior of an automobile pursuant to an arrest,
as shown by decisions which reach contrary conclusions even
though similar factual circumstances are present.53 The United
States Supreme Court recognized that the lower courts have
found "no workable definition of 'the area within the immediate
necessary to protect the officer's safety and also to prevent the concealment or de-
struction of evidence.
51. It would logically follow that searching a room other than where an arrest
occurs would, in most instances, not be necessary to insure officer safety and pre-
vent the destruction of evidence. Id. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47
(1970) (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). "Once an ac-
cused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without
a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest." Id.
52. 399 U.S. at 47.
53. Cases which have upheld a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful
arrest are:
United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980). In Sanders, government
agents observed the defendant in an automobile parked on the street. After not-
ing some peculiar behavior, the agents removed the defendant from his car. Dur-
ing the subsequent frisk, the agent spotted a small brown packet on the passenger
side of the floorboard and seized it. The packet contained heroin.
United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977). In Dixon, the defendant was
arrested by government agents while still in his car. After the defendant was or-
dered out of his car, one of the agents observed a revolver and a brown paper bag
on the floorboard; the agent seized both items.
United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 513 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1975). In Gonzalez-
Rodriguez, the defendant was arrested at the United States-Mexico border on the
belief that he was transporting firearms. Government agents then immediately
searched the defendant's camper.
United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973). Frick involved a defendant
who was arrested at his car by an F.B.I. agent who spotted an attache case lying
on the back seat of the defendant's car. The agent seized and searched the at-
tache case without a warrant and found incriminating evidence.
Cases which have held similar searches invalid are:
United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980). In Benson the defendant
was arrested and removed from his car and searched. Simultaneously, another
detective opened the back door of the car and seized the defendant's tote bag. The
detective then searched the tote bag and found cocaine.
United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980). In Rigales, the car in which
the defendant was traveling was stopped by a police officer for a traffic violation.
The police found several unspent bullets on the person of one of the occupants of
the car. Believing that a leather case on the floorboard of the car contained a
weapon, the officer seized and searched the case finding a pistol.
United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978). Stevie involved a defendant
who was ordered out of his rented car and placed under arrest. Government
agents then opened a suitcase on the floor of the car and discovered marijuana. .
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control of the arrestee"' as it relates to the interior compartment
of an automobile when the arrestee was its recent occupant.54
The inconsistancies among the lower courts,55 therefore, set the
stage for the resolution of this issue in Belton.
IV. THE MAoRITY DECISION
A. Reliance Upon Chimel
In Belton the Supreme Court based its decision on the princi-
ples established in Chimel v. California.5 6 The Court stated that
a lawful custodial arrest creates a situation permitting the war-
rantless search of the arrestee and the immediately surrounding
area.57 The majority in Belton went on to recognize that the de-
fendant was lawfully arrested on a charge of marijuana posses-
sion.58 The Court further held that the officer, after directing the
occupants out of the car, was justified in conducting a warrantless
search of the interior compartment of the automobile since it was
"within the arrestee's immediate control" as established in
Chimel.59
The majority also held that police could lawfully examine the
contents of any containers 6O found within the passenger compart-
ment. The majority reasoned that if the passenger compartment
is within the arrestee's immediate control, then any containers
found therein would also be within his immediate control.61 In
Belton, if the interior of the automobile was within the defend-
54. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. In light of this, the Court stated, "[w]hen a person can-
not know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation,
that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a po-
liceman know the scope of this authority." Id.
55. See note 53 supra.
56. 101 S. Ct. at 2864 n.3. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
57. 101 S. Ct. at 2864. See note 50 supra.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2865.
59. Id. The Court concluded by saying that the search of the defendant's jack-
et was a search incident to a lawful arrest, and therefore, did not violate the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. Id.
60. "Container" includes "closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or
other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as
luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like." Id. at 2864 n.4. The Court limited the
scope of the search to the "interior of the passenger compartment" and expressly
stated that it "does not encompass the trunk." Id. As interesting question
presented by Justice Brennan in his dissent was whether special rules would be
necessary for stationwagons and hatchbacks, where the luggage compartment may
be reached through the interior of the automobile. Id. at 2869.
61. Id. at 2864.
ant's immediate control, then the defendant could have conceiva-
bly reached a weapon or evidence located in the black leather
jacket on the backseat. It was further stated that "the lawful cus-
todial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the
arrestee may have."62
B. The Majority's Departure from Chimel's Rationale
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, recognized the importance of
interposing a detached and neutral magistrate between the police
and suspects when a search is involved. Consequently, he stated
that "exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be narrowly
construed."63 This is necessary to protect citizens "from unwar-
ranted intrusions into [their] privacy."6 4
Justice Brennan, while recognizing the Chimel exception to a
warrant requirement pursuant to a search,65 emphasized that
"compliance with the warrant requirement Ishould be excused]
only when the search 'is substantially contemporaneous with the
arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.' "66
This reasoning appears to be in harmony with Chimel's princi-
ples, which emphasize officer safety and the preservation of
evidence. 67
Since the defendant in Belton was already placed under arrest
and was outside of the car when the search took place, it would
seem that Chimel's rule would no longer be applicable. Under
such circumstances, it is hard to imagine any danger to officer
safety, since the defendant, who is under arrest, could not enter
the car to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.68 Since Belton
62. Id. See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), where the
Court upheld a full search of the person incident to a full custody arrest, and
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), where it was determined that the ar-
rest of the defendant was lawful, and therefore, the search of his person pursuant
to his arrest was also lawful.
63. 101 S. Ct. at 2866. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (absent exi-
gent circumstances, the police are required to obtain a warrant before searching
luggage taken from an automobile properly stopped and searched for contraband);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (similar facts and holding as Sand-
ers); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (searches conducted without
a neutral magistrate are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, subject
to few exceptions).
64. Id. at 2866 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958)). It was
stated that probable cause for belief that certain items subject to seizure are in a
building does not justify a search without a warrant. Id. at 497.
65. 101 S. Ct. at 2866. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2867 (quoting Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964)).
Thus, a time and space limitation is placed on a warrantless search. The limita-
tions, nevertheless permit an officer to search for weapons which may be used
against him and to search for evidence which may be destroyed by the arrestee.
67. See note 50 supra.
68. See note 63 supra.
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and the other occupants of the automobile were outside of the au-
tomobile, under arrest, and separated,69 Belton would have never
been able to make a dash to the automobile, open its doors, unzip
the zipper to his jacket, and obtain a weapon or destroy evi-
dence.7 0 While the defendant Chimel may not have realistically
been able to make a dash to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence,
the scenario in Belton is distinguishable from Chimel. Chimel
stood in the same room, or enclosed area, in which the police
searched.7 1 Yet, in Belton, the defendant stood outside the en-
closed area in which the police searched. This type of distinction
was noted in Chimel when Justice Stewart, writing for the major-
ity, stated that "[t]here is no . . . justification . . .for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs."72
Clearly, the situation in Belton is analogous to such a search of
another room, in that standing outside of an automobile that is
being searched is the same as standing in one room while the ad-
joining room is being searched.
Justice Brennan framed the issue under Chimel as "not
whether the arrestee could ever have reached the area that was
searched, but whether he could have reached it at the time of ar-
rest and search."7 3 If the arrestee cannot possibly reach the area
69. 101 S. Ct. at 2862.
70. Justice Brennan correctly pointed out that Chimel places "temporal and
spatial limitations" on warrantless searches incident to an arrest. Id. at 2867. See
also Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), where police arrested the defendant in
front of his house, made a brief inspection of the house to determine if anyone
else was there, and then made a warrantless search of the house for narcotics they
believed were hidden there. The search was held invalid. Id. at 35. The Court,
quoting Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969), said, "[a] search may be inci-
dent to an arrest 'only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is
confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.'" 399 U.S. at 33 (emphasis in orig-
inal). In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), the Court held
that a search of a vehicle after an arrest was unlawful where the car had not been
impounded and the defendant was taken immediately to court to make bail.
71. 395 U.S. at 754. It was Chimel, or at least his wife, who stood in the room
while the police searched.
72. Id. at 763. Note further that Belton was arrested while standing outside
the vehicle. 101 S. Ct. at 2862.
73. 101 S. Ct. at 2868. This statement by Justice Brennan is in harmony with
Chimel's underlying rationale of protecting the officer in the field and preventing
and destruction of evidence. If an arrestee cannot possibly reach an area after his
arrest, then Chimel's rationale is not applicable and a search warrant should be
obtained. Taken to its extreme conclusion, if an officer could conduct a warrant-
less search of an area that was, at a time close to the arrest, under an arrestee's
control, the officer would be justified in doing so, even though the arrestee may be
incarcerated 100 miles away. This is hardly a result called for by Chimel.
searched at the time of the search, then Chimel is not applicable.
It is this critical limitation which the majority failed to deal with
effectively in Belton.
V. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE DECISION
A. Does the Majority Establish a "Bright Line" Rule?
Justice Brennan believed that the majority failed to establish a
"bright line" rule74 to guide the police officer in the field.75
Though the officer may be able to draw a distinction between the
interior of a car and the trunk,76 under the Anajority's holding,
such a distinction becomes blurred when, for example, the auto-
mobile is a stationwagon or hatchback model.77 As Justice Bren-
nan's dissent pointed out, "the Court's new rule abandons the
justifications underlying Chimel [and thus] it offers no guidance
to the police officer seeking to work out these answers for him-
self."78 Justice Brennan echoed the fear expressed in Chimel,
that if a search is allowed to go into areas beyond the person and
the immediate control of the arrestee, then there is no point of ra-
tional limitation.79
B. Concern for Luggage, Briefcases and Other Containers
Justice White, in his dissent, expressed concern over the fact
that the majority, by its holding, possibly allows the warrantless
search of luggage, briefcases, and other containers in the interior
of an automobile even in the absence of any suspicion that they
74. A "bright line" rule may be seen as a "single familiar standard" which
would guide police officers in certain situations they confronted. Such a standard
is necessary because officers have only limited time and legal training to make de-
cisions which may infringe on personal interests. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 213-14 (1979).
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2869. Justice Brennan stated that "the Court's attempt to forge
a 'bright line' rule fails on its own terms." Id.
76. The distinction between the interior of a car and a trunk is significant in
that the officer may search the interior of the car if a person is arrested in close
proximity of the interior because this is an area from which a weapon may be
reached or evidence destroyed. But a warrantless search of the trunk would not
be justified because the arrestee would not be able to reach a weapon or destroy
evidence in the trunk.
77. In a stationwagon or a hatchback, the interior of the car is connected to the
trunk or storage area. Thus, the trunk is readily accessible from the interior of the
car. The question presented is whether the police officer can conduct a warrant-
less search of this trunk area in order to discover weapons or preserve evidence.
78. 101 S. Ct. at 2869 (emphasis in original).
79. 395 U.S. at 766. Concern for such a doctrine was also expressed in Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 at 393 (1978). Homicide detectives conducted a warrantless
search of the defendant's apartment after a shootout in which an undercover of-
ficer was killed. The Court stated that the search was invalid because there was
no emergency situation. Id.
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contain anything in which the police have a legitimate interest.80
In United States v. Chadwick, federal narcotic agents opened the
defendant's footlocker without consent or a search warrant and
found large amounts of marijuana in it.81 The Court there stated
that a person's "expectations of privacy in personal luggage are
substantially greater than in an automobile."82 On that basis, the
search was held unconstitutional. A similarity between Belton
and Chadwick can be found, in that a person has a greater expec-
tation of privacy both in a footlocker and a jacket than he does in
an automobile. A jacket, like a footlocker, can contain personal
items which an individual may desire to keep from public view. It
is this interest in privacy which the fourth amendment apparently
seeks to protect.
It would seem that the warrantless search of containers in an
automobile is no longer justified83 by the "automobile excep-
tion"84 when the automobile and container are under police con-
trol. If an automobile is under police control, there is no risk that
it will be moved out of the jurisdiction before a search warrant is
obtained. Likewise, the containers therein are equally secure.
Once police have control of the item to be searched, there is
time to obtain a search warrant from a magistrate. 85 It was the
recognition that the container could not be removed before a
search warrant was obtained that led the Court in Chadwick86
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2870. Justice White's premise, that there was no probable
cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found, may be
faulty. The officer in Belton smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope marked
"Supergold" which he associated with marijuana. Id. at 2861-62. This may have
led the officer to believe that more marijuana was to be found.
81. 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (the defendant's footlocker was in the automobile's
trunk).
82. Id. at 13. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), see notes 17-18 infra
and accompanying text, the Court recognized and protected an individual's pri-
vacy interest in a public telephone booth. The Court held that bugging a public
telephone and listening to the defendant's conversation infringed upon the reason-
able expectation of privacy upon which the user justifiably relied. Id. at 353. The
Court there was protecting the defendant's "expectation of privacy."
83. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981) (A warrantless search of a
container in a car trunk was not allowed even though there was probable cause to
do so).
84. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
85. An argument can be made that obtaining a search warrant under these cir-
cumstances is a mere formality, therefore justifying a warrantless search. None-
theless, it is a detached, neutral magistrate who must decide if probable cause to
search exists, thus permitting the issuance of a warrant.
86. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, federal narcotic agents removed a footlock-
er from the defendant's automobile and brought it to the Federal Building in Bos-
and Arkansas v. Sanders8 7 to hold that the warrantless searches
violated the fourth amendment. Unless an officer suspects that a
container under his control contains a weapon, or circumstances
require immediate action,8 8 Justice White's point is well taken: a
warrant is a condition precedent to the search.
VI. IMPACT
A. Belton Constitutes a Radical Departure From Chimel
The Belton decision is a radical departure from Chimel in that it
fails to reflect Chimel's underlying policy.89 The Chimel decision
allowed for a warrantless search of the area within the "immedi-
ate control" of the arrestee.90 Thus, the officer knew the bounda-
ries of the area in which he could conduct a warrantless search.
Chimel provided the officer with a reasonable, workable guide.
This was so, because an officer could reasonably determine the
area from which an arrestee could obtain a weapon or reach evi-
dence and destroy it.
In Chimel, after the defendant was arrested in his house, the
police conducted a warrantless search of the entire house.9 l A
search of the entire house was not justified, since, at the time,
there was no risk that the defendant might obtain a weapon or de-
stroy evidence in another part of the house. Therefore, the Court
established that the police may search only the area "within the
immediate control"92 of the arrestee, for this is where a weapon
may be retrieved or evidence destroyed. Comparing the facts in
Belton, one finds that the officer had removed the occupants from
the automobile and placed them under arrest. The officer then
patted the individuals down and separated them so they could not
make physical contact with each other. If the majority in Belton
had followed the rationale of Chimel, it would have been evident
that there was no need to conduct a warrantless search of the au-
tomobile at that time. There was no risk that the individuals
would obtain a weapon from or destroy evidence in the automo-
ton. Thus, the footlocker could not have been moved by the defendant before a
search warrant was obtained.
87. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). See also note 53 supra. In Sanders, police officers
stopped a taxi and requested that the driver open the trunk. The police found a
suitcase in the trunk and opened it without the consent of the defendant or his
companion; marijuana was discovered inside.
88. See note 50 supra.
89. Chimel permits an officer to search the area within the "immediate con-
trol" of the arrestee in order to find weapons which may be used against the officer
or to prevent the destruction of evidence by the arrestee. 395 U.S. at 763.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 754.
92. Id. at 763.
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bile. The automobile was no longer "within the immediate con-
trol" of the arrestees. 9 3 Under these circumstances, the proper
conduct by the officer would have been to secure the automobile
and present evidence to a magistrate which would justify the is-
suance of a search warrant.
Belton has the effect, then, of expanding the permissible scope
of searches incident to an arrest by allowing officers to search ar-
eas which could not possibly be reached by arrestees at the time of
the arrest. It can be clearly seen that Belton is a significant de-
parture from Chimel since the search was not reasonably moti-
vated by a desire to insure officer safety or prevent the
destruction of evidence. Instead, Belton reflects the proposition
that if the area searched was within the arrestee's immediate con-
trol just prior to his arrest, then the search is valid.
B. Belton Did Not Establish a "Bright Line" Rule
Before the Belton decision, an officer was guided by the rule
that he could search the area within the arrestee's "immediate
control."9 4 As previously stated, an officer in the field can fairly
interpret the boundaries of the area within the arrestee's "imme-
diate control." However, Belton allows the officer to conduct a
warrantless search of the arrestee's automobile when the arrestee
was merely its recent occupant. This fails to establish a "bright
line" rule to guide the officer in his work. For example, when an
officer is conducting a search of the interior of an automobile, he
will encounter problems if it is a hatchback model where the lug-
gage compartment can be reached from the interior. The ques-
tion presented is whether the officer may conduct a search of this
luggage compartment. Under the Belton holding, the officer
would be permitted to invade the luggage area simply because
the person arrested was recently in the automobile. 95
Similarly, the Belton decision fails to effectively articulate the
extent to Which the interior of an automobile may be searched.
93. The Court, in Chimel, construed the area "within the immediate control"
of the arrestee to be "the area from which [the arrestee] might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence." Id.
94. Id. See notes 60, 74-75 supra.
95. The Court in Belton held that "when a policeman has made a lawful custo-
dial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporanious inci-
dent of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." 101 S.
Ct. at 2864.
To be decided in the future is the important issue of whether an
officer may search the interior door panels, the floorboard, or the
upholstery. Can the officer, in effect, "strip" the interior of the au-
tomobile? Since Chimel's underlying rationale was not followed
in Belton, the officer has a less than adequate guide to help him
answer these questions. Belton, then, poses more questions than
it answers.
While the Court in Belton insisted that it was following
Chimel,96 in that it held that the defendant's jacket was "within
the meaning of the Chimel case,"97 it nevertheless reached be-
yond the limitations imposed by Chimel. Despite the fact, that
the Court has retained the "immediate control" language, the fac-
tual inconsistencies between Chimel and Belton leave open the
precise boundaries of that language and test.
C. The Belton Decision and the Exclusionary Rule
The competing interests involved with the administration of the
exclusionary rule98 are, on the one hand, effective law enforce-
ment, and, on the other, deterrence of unlawful police conduct
and avoidance of judicial sanction of such unlawful police con-
duct.9 9 In the area of searches, the exclusionary rule mandates
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment not
be admitted into evidence.O0 Thus, the exclusionary rule acts to
deter police from violating an individual's protected rights.101 Po-
96. The Court stated that "[olur holding today does no more than determine
the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic content."
101 S. Ct. at 2864 n.3.
97. Id. at 2865.
98. The exclusionary rule provides for the exclusion from a criminal prosecu-
tion of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. The exclusionary rule
was first established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where the
Court held that any evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the fourth
amendment would be barred from a federal prosecution. Id. at 398. In Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) the Court held that "all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible in a state court."
Id. at 655.
99. D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT's RGors TODAY 295-96 (1976). A similar sen-
timent was echoed by Chief Justice Warren in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959), where he identified the two fundamental interests of society which conflict
as society's interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its interest in
preventing the rights of its members from being abridged by illegal law enforce-
ment. Id.
100. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (application of the exclusion-
ary rule where evidence obtained by an illegal search was not admissible into
evidence).
101. In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), the Court stated that
"[tihe rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to com-
pel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way-
by removing the incentive to disregard it."
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lice will be hesistant to conduct an illegal search if the fruits of
the search will not be allowed into evidence at the defendant's
trial.
The Court, in Belton, has attempted to tip the balance in favor
of law enforcement. This was done by extending the scope within
which a warrantless search can be conducted. 0 2 The Belton deci-
sion thus extends the area in which law enforcement officers may
operate without running afoul of the exclusionary rule.
Yet, the Belton decision has in the same instance hampered the
police in law enforcement. This is so because Belton does not es-
tablish any guidelines to aid the officer in determining how far he
may go in conducting a warrantless search. 0 3 An officer, not
knowing the area in which a legal search can be conducted, runs
the risk of seizing evidence which will later be suppressed at the
defendant's trial.104 Thus, the Belton decision has' the effect of al-
lowing officers to avoid the exclusionary rule in certain situations,
and yet, leading them into its clutches in others.
D. Belton's Effect on Future Cases
It is the author's belief that courts will look to Belton, and not
Chimel, when determining the proper scope of a warrantless
search of an automobile. In the future, a warrantless search of an
automobile will most likely be upheld if the arrestee was its re-
cent occupant. Chimel's "immediate control" test will probably
no longer be viable in this area. As a consequence, just how far
an officer may go in searching the interior of an automobile will
be left to the conscience of the court deciding the issue. This is
the natural result of a decision such as Belton which offers no
concrete guidelines.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in New York v. Belton extended the scope
of a warrantless search pursuant to an arrest to include the inte-
rior compartment of an automobile in which the arrestee had
been riding. In so doing, the Court departed from the rationale of
102. See notes 56-62 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text.
104. "The introduction of the [e]xclusionary [r]ule to state law enforcement
systems has made it necessary for all state and local law enforcement officers to
know the law or to suffer the frustration of losing cases." J. CREAMER, THE LAW OF
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 92 (1968).
Chimel. This departure is critical, because the Court has abro-
gated the useful guidelines established in Chimel. In its wake,
Belton has left the permissible scope of warrantless searches sub-
ject to speculation.
In the future, the Court will. likely have to answer many ques-
tions relating to the scope and time of the search of the interior of
an automobile. Just how the Court will rule on these questions
cannot be known, for the Court, by its decision in Belton, has left
itself with no guidelines with which to work.
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